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Germany
This paper discusses the importance of three features of psychometric tests for
cognition research: construct definition, problem space, and knowledge domain.
Definition of constructs, e.g., intelligence or creativity, forms the theoretical basis for test
construction. Problem space, being well or ill-defined, is determined by the cognitive
abilities considered to belong to the constructs, e.g., convergent thinking to intelligence,
divergent thinking to creativity. Knowledge domain and the possibilities it offers cognition
are reflected in test results. We argue that (a) comparing results of tests with different
problem spaces is more informative when cognition operates in both tests on an
identical knowledge domain, and (b) intertwining of abilities related to both constructs
can only be expected in tests developed to instigate such a process. Test features
should guarantee that abilities can contribute to self-generated and goal-directed
processes bringing forth solutions that are both new and applicable. We propose and
discuss a test example that was developed to address these issues.
Keywords: creative cognition, cognitive neuroscience, creative reasoning, problem space, knowledge domain
Much of cognition research is based on psychometric tests, such as tests assessing the constructs of
intelligence or creativity. We argue that three test features must be explicitly considered, however,
in order to reliably infer from individual’s test performance the underlying cognitive processes.
These three test features are: definition of the construct, problem space, and knowledge domain.
The definition of the construct a test is to measure is most important in test construction and
application, because cognitive processes reflect the possibilities a task offers. For instance, a test
constructed to assess intelligence will operationalize the definition of this construct, being, in short,
finding the correct answer. Also, the definition of a construct becomes important when selecting
tests for the confirmation of a specific hypothesis. One can only find confirmation for a hypothesis
if the chosen task instigates the necessary cognitive operations. For instance, in trying to confirm
the assumed intertwining of certain cognitive abilities (e.g., convergent thinking and divergent
thinking), tasks should be applied that have shown to yield the necessary cognitive process.
The second test feature, problem space, determines the degrees of freedom cognition has to its
disposal in solving a problem. For instance, cognition will go through a wider search path when
problem constraints are less well defined and, consequently, data will differ accordingly.
The third test feature, knowledge domain, is important when comparing results from two
different tests. When tests differ in problem space, it is not advisable they should differ in knowledge
domain. For instance, when studying the differences in cognitive abilities between tests constructed
to asses convergent thinking (mostly defined problem space) and divergent thinking (mostly
ill-defined problem space), in general test practice, both tests also differ in knowledge domain.
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Hence, data will reflect cognition operating not only in different
problem spaces, but also operating on different knowledge
domains, which makes the interpretation of results ambiguous.
The proposed approach for test development and test
application holds the promise of, firstly, studying cognitive
abilities in different problem spaces while operating on an
identical knowledge domain. Although cognitions’ operations
have been studied extensively and superbly in both contexts
separately, they have rarely been studied in test situations where
one or the other test feature is controlled for. The proposed
approach also presents a unique method for studying thinking
processes in which cognitive abilities intertwine. On the basis
of defined abilities, tasks can be developed that have a higher
probability of yielding the hypothesized results.
The construct of intelligence is defined as the ability to
produce the single best (or correct) answer to a clearly defined
question, such as a proof to a theorem (Simon, 1973). It may also
be seen as a domain-general ability (g-factor; Spearman, 1904;
Cattell, 1967) that has much in common with meta cognitive
functions, such as metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive
monitoring, and metacognitive control (Saraç et al., 2014).
The construct of creativity, in contrast, is defined as the
ability to innovate and move beyond what is already known
(Wertheimer, 1945/1968; Ghiselin, 1952/1985; Vernon, 1970). In
other words, it emphasizes the aspect of innovation. This involves
the ability to consider things from an uncommon perspective,
transcend the old order (Ghiselin, 1952/1985; Chi, 1997; Ward,
2007), and explore loosely associated ideas (Guilford, 1950;
Mednick, 1962; Koestler, 1964; Gentner, 1983; Boden, 1990;
Christensen, 2007). Creativity could also be defined as the ability
to generate a solution to problems with ill-defined problem spaces
(Wertheimer, 1945/1968; Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi, 1976). In
this sense it involves the ability to identify problematic aspects of
a given situation (Ghiselin, 1952/1985) and, in a wider sense, the
ability to define completely new problems (Getzels, 1975, 1987).
Guilford (1956) introduced the constructs of convergent
thinking and divergent thinking abilities. Both thinking abilities
are important because they allow us insights in human
problem solving. On the basis of their definitions convergent
and divergent thinking help us to structurally study human
cognitive operations in different situations and over different
developmental stages. Convergent thinking is defined as the
ability to apply conventional and logical search, recognition,
and decision-making strategies to stored information in order
to produce an already known answer (Cropley, 2006). Divergent
thinking, by contrast, is defined as the ability to produce
new approaches and original ideas by forming unexpected
combinations from available information and by applying such
abilities as semantic flexibility, and fluency of association,
ideation, and transformation (Guilford, 1959, as cited in Cropley,
2006, p. 1). Divergent thinking brings forth answers that may
never have existed before and are often novel, unusual, or
surprising (Cropley, 2006).
Guilford (1967) introduced convergent and divergent
thinking as part of a set of five operations that apply in his
Structure of Intellect model (SOI model) on six products
and four kinds of content, to produce 120 different factors of
cognitive abilities. With the SOI model Guilford wanted to give
the construct of intelligence a comprehensive model. He wanted
the model to include all aspects of intelligence, many of which
had been seriously neglected in traditional intelligence testing
because of a persistent adherence to the belief in Spearman’s g
(Guilford, 1967, p. vii). Hence, Guilford envisaged cognition to
embrace, among other abilities, both convergent and divergent
thinking abilities. After these new constructs were introduced
and defined, tests for convergent and divergent thinking
emerged. Despite the fact that Guilford reported significant
loadings of tests for divergent production on tests constructed
to measure convergent production (Guilford, 1967, p. 155),
over the years, both modes of thinking were considered as
separate identities where convergent thinking tests associated
with intelligence and divergent thinking tests with creativity
(Cropley, 2006; Shye and Yuhas, 2004). Even intelligence tests
that assess aspects of intelligence that supposedly reflect creative
abilities do not actually measure creativity (Kaufman, 2015).
The idea that both convergent and divergent thinking are
important for solving problems, and that intelligence helps in the
creative process, is not really new. In literature we find models of
the creative process that define certain stages to convergent and
divergent thinking; the stages of purposeful preparation at the
start and those of critical verification at the end of the process,
respectively (Wallas, 1926; Webb Young, 1939/2003). In this
view, divergent thinking enables the generation of new ideas
whereas the exploratory activities of convergent thinking enable
the conversion of ideas into something new and appropriate
(Cropley and Cropley, 2008).
We argue that studying the abilities of divergent and
convergent thinking in isolation does not suffice to give us
complete insight of all possible aspects of human problem
solving, its constituent abilities and the structure of its processes.
Processes that in a sequence of thoughts and actions lead to novel
and adaptive productions (Lubart, 2001) are more demanding of
cognition for understanding the situation at hand and planning
a path to a possible solution, than abilities involved in less
complex situations (Jaušovec, 1999). Processes that yield self-
generated and goal-directed thought are the most complex
cognitive processes that can be studied (Beaty et al., 2016).
Creative cognition literature is moving toward the view that
especially in those processes that yield original and appropriate
solutions within a specific context, convergent and divergent
abilities intertwine (Cropley, 2006; Ward, 2007; Gabora, 2010).
The approach of intertwining cognitive abilities is also
developed within cognitive neuroscience by focusing on the
intertwining of brain networks (Beaty et al., 2016). In this
approach divergent thinking relates to the default brain network.
This network operates in defocused or associative mode of
thought yielding spontaneous and self-generated cognition
(Beaty et al., 2015). Convergent thinking relates to the executive
control network operating in focused or analytic modes of
thought, yielding updating, shifting, and inhibition (Benedek
et al., 2014). Defocused attention theory (Mendelssohn, 1976)
states that less creative individuals operate with a more focused
attention than do creative individuals. This theory argues that
e.g., attending to two things at the same time, might result in one
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analogy, while attending to four things might yield six analogies
(Martindale, 1999).
In the process of shifting back and forth along the spectrum
between associative and analytic modes of thinking, the fruits
of associative thought become ingredients for analytic thought
processes, and vice versa (Gabora, 2010). In this process, mental
imagery is involved as one sensory aspect of the human ability to
gather and process information (Jung and Haier, 2013). Mental
imagery is fed by scenes in the environment that provide crucial
visual clues for creative problem solving and actuates the need for
sketching (Verstijnen et al., 2001).
Creative problem solving processes often involve an
interactive relationship between imagining, sketching, and
evaluating the result of the sketch (van Leeuwen et al., 1999).
This interactive process evolves within a type of imagery called
“visual reasoning” where forms and shapes are manipulated in
order to specify the configurations and properties of the design
entities (Goldschmidt, 2013). The originality of inventions is
predicted by the application of visualization, whereas their
practicality is predicted by the vividness of imagery (Palmiero
et al., 2015). Imaginative thought processes emerge from our
conceptual knowledge of the world that is represented in our
semantic memory system. In constrained divergent thinking,
the neural correlates of this semantic memory system partially
overlap with those of the creative cognition system (Abraham
and Bubic, 2015).
Studies of convergent and divergent thinking abilities have
yielded innumerable valuable insights on the cognitive and
neurological aspects involved, e.g., reaction times, strategies,
brain areas involved, mental representations, and short and long
time memory components. Studies on the relationship between
both constructs suggest that it is unlikely that individuals employ
similar cognitive strategies when solving more convergent than
more divergent thinking tasks (Jaušovec, 2000). However, to
arrive at a quality formulation the creative process cannot
do without the application of both, convergent and divergent
thinking abilities (e.g., Kaufmann, 2003; Runco, 2003; Sternberg,
2005; Dietrich, 2007; Cropley and Cropley, 2008; Silvia et al.,
2013; Jung, 2014).
When it is our aim to study the networks addressed by
the intertwining of convergent and divergent thinking processes
that are considered to operate when new, original, and yet
appropriate solutions are generated, then traditional thinking
tests like intelligence tests and creativity tests are not appropriate;
they yield processes related to the definition of one or the other
type of construct.
CREATIVE REASONING TASK
According to the new insights gained in cognition research, we
need tasks that are developed with the aim to instigate precisely
the kind of thinking processes we are looking for. Tasks should
also provide a method of scoring independently the contribution
of convergent and divergent thinking. As one possible solution
for such tasks we present the Creative Reasoning Task (CRT;
Jaarsveld, 2007; Jaarsveld et al., 2010, 2012, 2013).
The CRT presents participants with an empty 3 × 3 matrix
and asks them to fill it out, as original and complex as possible,
by creating components and the relationships that connect them.
The created matrix can, in principle, be solved by another person.
The creation of components is entirely free, as is the generation
of the relationships that connects them into a completed pattern.
Created matrices are scored with two sub scores; Relations,
which scores the logical complexity of a matrix and is, therefore,
considered a measure for convergent thinking, and Components
and Specifications, which scores the originality, fluency, and
flexibility and, therefore, is considered an indication for divergent
thinking (for a more detailed description of the score method, see
Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material).
Psychometric studies with the CRT showed, firstly, that
convergent and divergent thinking abilities apply within this
task and can be assessed independently. The CRT sub score
Relations correlated with the Standard Progressive Matrices test
(SPM) and the CRT sub score Components and Specifications
correlated with a standard creativity test (TCT–DP, Test of
Creative Thinking–Drawing Production; Urban and Jellen, 1995;
Jaarsveld et al., 2010, 2012, 2013). Studies further showed that,
although a correlation was observed for the intelligence and
creativity test scores, no correlation was observed between the
CRT sub scores relating to intelligent and creative performances
(Jaarsveld et al., 2012, 2013; for further details about the
CRT’s objectivity, validity, and reliability, see Appendix 2 in
Supplementary Material).
Reasoning in creative thinking can be defined as the
involvement of executive/convergent abilities in the inhibition
of ideas and the updating of information (Benedek et al., 2014).
Jung (2014) describes a dichotomy for cognitive abilities with at
one end the dedicated system that relies on explicit and conscious
knowledge and at the other end the improvisational system that
relies more upon implicit or unconscious knowledge systems.
The link between explicit and implicit systems can actually be
traced back to Kris’ psychoanalytic approach to creativity dating
from the 1950s. The implicit system refers to Kris’ primary
process of adaptive regression, where unmodulated thoughts
intrude into consciousness; the explicit system refers to the
secondary process, where the reworking and transformation of
primary process material takes place through reality-oriented
and ego-controlled thinking (Sternberg and Lubart, 1999). The
interaction between explicit and implicit systems can be seen
to form the basis of creative reasoning, i.e., the cognitive
ability to solve problems in an effective and adaptive way. This
interaction evolved as a cognitive mechanism when human
survival depended on finding effective solutions to both common
and novel problem situations (Gabora and Kaufman, 2010).
Creative reasoning solves that minority of problems that are
unforeseen and yet of high adaptability (Jung, 2014).
Hence, common tests are insufficient when it comes to solving
problems that are unforeseen and yet of high adaptability,
because they present problems that are either unforeseen
and measure certain abilities contained in the construct of
creativity or they address adaptability and measure certain
abilities contained in the construct of intelligence. The CRT
presents participants with a problem that they could not have
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foreseen; the form is blank and offers no stimuli. All tests,
even creativity tests, present participants with some kind of
stimuli. The CRT addresses adaptability; to invent from scratch
a coherent structure that can be solved by another person, like
creating a crossword puzzle. Problems, that are unforeseen and
of high adaptability, are solved by the application of abilities from
both constructs.
NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVE
COGNITION
Studies in neuroscience showed that cognition operating in ill-
defined problem space not only applies divergent thinking but
also benefits from additional convergent operations (Gabora,
2010; Jung, 2014). Understanding creative cognition may be
advanced when we study the flow of information among brain
areas (Jung et al., 2010).
In a cognitive neuroscience study with the CRT we focused
on the cognitive process evolving within this task. Participants
performed the CRT while EEG alpha activity was registered.
EEG alpha synchronization in frontal areas is understood as
an indication of top-down control (Cooper et al., 2003). When
observed in frontal areas, for divergent and convergent thinking
tasks, it may not reflect a brain state that is specific for creative
cognition but could be attributed to the high processing demands
typically involved in creative thinking (Benedek et al., 2011).
Top-down control, relates to volitionally focusing attention to
task demands (Buschman and Miller, 2007). That this control
plays a role in tasks with an ill-defined problem space showed
when electroencephalography (EEG) alpha synchronization was
stronger for individuals engaged in creative ideation tasks
compared to an intelligence related tasks (Fink et al., 2007,
2009; Fink and Benedek, 2014). This activation was also found
for the CRT; task related alpha synchronization showed that
convergent thinking was integrated in the divergent thinking
processes. Analyzes of the stages in the CRT process showed
that this alpha synchronization was especially visible at the
start of the creative process at prefrontal and frontal sites
when information processing was most demanding, i.e., due
to multiplicity of ideas, and it was visible at the end of the
process, due to narrowing down of alternatives (Jaarsveld et al.,
2015).
A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
(Beaty et al., 2015) with a creativity task in which cognition had
to meet specific constraints, showed the networks involved.
The default mode network which drives toward abstraction
and metaphorical thinking and the executive control network
driving toward certainty (Jung, 2014). Control involves not only
maintenance of patterns of activity that represent goals and the
means to achieve those (Miller and Cohen, 2001), but also their
voluntary suppression when no longer needed, as well as the
flexible shift between different goals and mental sets (Abraham
and Windmann, 2007). Attention can be focused volitionally by
top-down signals derived from task demands and automatically
by bottom-up signals from salient stimuli (Buschman and Miller,
2007). Intertwining between top-down and bottom-up attention
processes in creative cognition ensures a broadening of attention
in free associative thinking (Abraham and Windmann, 2007).
These studies support and enhance the findings of creative
cognition research in showing that the generation of original
and applicable ideas involves an intertwining between different
abilities, networks, and attention processes.
PROBLEM SPACE
A problem space is an abstract representation, in the mind of
the problem solver, of the encountered problem and of the asked
for solution (Simon and Newell, 1971; Simon, 1973; Hayes and
Flowers, 1986; Kulkarni and Simon, 1988; Runco, 2007). The
space that comes with a certain problem can, according to the
constraints that are formulated for the solution, be labeled well-
defined or ill-defined (Simon and Newell, 1971). Consequently,
the original problems are labeled closed and open problems,
respectively (Jaušovec, 2000).
A problem space contains all possible states that are
accessible to the problem solver from the initial state,
through iterative application of transformation rules, to
the goal state (Newell and Simon, 1972; Anderson, 1983).
The initial state presents the problem solver with a task
description that defines which requirements a solution has to
answer. The goal state represents the solution. The proposed
solution is a product of the application of transformation
rules (algorithms and heuristics) on a series of successive
intermediate solutions. The proposed solution is also a
product of the iterative evaluations of preceding solutions
and decisions based upon these evaluations (Boden, 1990;
Gabora, 2002; Jaarsveld and van Leeuwen, 2005; Goldschmidt,
2014). Whether all possible states need to be passed through
depends on the problem space being well or ill-defined
and this, in turn, depends on the character of the task
descriptions.
When task descriptions clearly state which requirements a
solution has to answer then the inferences made will show little
idiosyncratic aspects and will adhere to the task constraints.
As a result, fewer options for alternative paths are open to the
problem solver and search for a solution evolves in a well-defined
space. Vice versa, when task or problem descriptions are fuzzy
and under specified, the problem solver’s inferences are more
idiosyncratic; the resulting process will evolve within an ill-
defined space and will contain more generative-evaluative cycles
in which new goals are set, and the cycle is repeated (Dennett,
1978, as cited in Gabora, 2002, p. 126).
Tasks that evolve in defined problem space are, e.g., traditional
intelligence tests (e.g., Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS;
and SPM, Raven, 1938/1998). The above tests consist of different
types of questions, each testing a different component of
intelligence. They are used in test practice to assess reasoning
abilities in diverse domains, such as, abstract, logical, spatial,
verbal, numerical, and mathematical domains. These tests have
clearly stated task descriptions and each item has one and only
one correct solution that has to be generated from memory
or chosen from a set of alternatives, like in multiple choice
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formats. Tests can be constructed to assess crystallized or fluid
intelligence. Crystallized intelligence represents abilities acquired
through learning, practice, and exposure to education, while fluid
intelligence represents a more basic capacity that is valuable to
reasoning and problem solving in contexts not necessarily related
to school education (Carroll, 1982).
Tasks that evolve in ill-defined problem space are, e.g.,
standard creativity tests. These types of test ask for a multitude of
ideas to be generated in association with a given item or situation
(e.g., “think of as many titles for this story”). Therefore, they
are also labeled as divergent thinking test. Although they assess
originality, fluency, flexibility of responses, and elaboration,
they are not constructed, however, to score appropriateness or
applicability. Divergent thinking tests assess one limited aspect
of what makes an individual creative. Creativity depends also on
variables like affect and intuition; therefore, divergent thinking
can only be considered an indication of an individual’s creative
potential (Runco, 2008). More precisely, divergent thinking
explains just under half of the variance in adult creative potential,
which is more than three times that of the contribution of
intelligence (Plucker, 1999, p. 103). Creative achievement, by
contrast, is commonly assessed by means of self-reports such as
biographical questionnaires in which participants indicate their
achievement across various domains (e.g., literature, music, or
theater).
Studies with the CRT showed that problem space differently
affects processing of and comprehension of relationships between
components. Problem space did not affect the ability to process
complex information. This ability showed equal performance
in well and ill-defined problem spaces (Jaarsveld et al., 2012,
2013). However, problem space did affect the comprehension
of relationships, which showed in the different frequencies of
relationships solved and created (Jaarsveld et al., 2010, 2012).
Problem space also affected the neurological activity as displayed
when individuals solve open or closed problems (Jaušovec, 2000).
Problem space further affected trends over grade levels of
primary school children for relationships solved in well-defined
and applied in ill-defined problem space. Only one of the 12
relationships defined in the CRT, namely Combination, showed
an increase with grade for both types of problem spaces (Jaarsveld
et al., 2013). In the same study, cognitive development in the CRT
showed in the shifts of preference for a certain relationship. These
shifts seem to correspond to Piaget’s developmental stages (Piaget
et al., 1977; Siegler, 1998) which are in evidence in the CRT, but
not in the SPM (Jaarsveld et al., 2013).
DESIGN PROBLEMS
A sub category of problems with an ill-defined problem space
are represented by design problems. In contrast to divergent
thinking tasks that ask for the generation of a multitude of ideas,
in design tasks interim ideas are nurtured and incrementally
developed until they are appropriate for the task. Ideas are rarely
discarded and replaced with new ideas (Goel and Pirolli, 1992).
The CRT could be considered a design problem because it yields
(a) one possible solution and (b) an iterative thinking process
that involves the realization of a vague initial idea. In the CRT
a created matrix, which is a closed problem, is created within an
ill-defined problem space. Design problems can be found, e.g.,
in engineering, industrial design, advertising, software design,
and architecture (Sakar and Chakrabarti, 2013), however, they
can also be found in the arts, e.g., poetry, sculpting, and dance
geography.
These complex problems are partly determined by unalterable
needs, requirements and intentions but the major part of the
design problem is undetermined (Dorst, 2004). This author
points out that besides containing an original and a functional
value, these types of problems contain an aesthetic value. He
further states that the interpretation of the design problem and
the creation and selection of possible suitable solutions can only
be decided during the design process on the basis of proposals
made by the designer.
In design problems the generation stage may be considered
a divergent thinking process. However, not in the sense that it
moves in multiple directions or generates multiple possibilities
as in a divergent thinking tests, but in the sense that it unrolls
by considering an initially vague idea from different perspectives
until it comes into focus and requires further processing to
become viable. These processes can be characterized by a set
of invariant features (Goel and Pirolli, 1992), e.g., structuring,
iteration, and coherence.
Structuring of the initial situation is required in design
processes before solving can commence. The problem contains
little structured and clear information about its initial state
and about the requirements of its solution. Therefore,
design problems allow or even require re-interpretation of
transformation rules; for instance, rearranging the location of
furniture in a room according to a set of desirable outcomes.
Here one uncovers implicit requirements that introduce a set of
new transformations and/or eliminate existing ones (Barsalou,
1992; Goel and Pirolli, 1992) or, when conflicting requirements
arise, one creates alternatives and/or introduces new trade-offs
between the conflicting constraints (Yamamoto et al., 2000;
Dorst, 2011).
A second aspect of design processes is their iterative character.
After structuring and planning a vague idea emerges, which is the
result of the merging of memory items. A vague idea is a cognitive
structure that, halfway the creative process is still ill defined and,
therefore, can be said to exist in a state of potentiality (Gabora
and Saab, 2011). Design processes unroll in an iterative way by the
inspection and adjustment of the generated ideas (Goldschmidt,
2014). New meanings are created and realized while the creative
mind imposes its own order and meaning on the sensory data
and through creative production furthers its own understanding
of the world (Arnheim, 1962/1974, as cited in Grube and Davis,
1988, pp. 263–264).
A third aspect of design processes is coherence. Coherence
theories characterize coherence in, for instance, philosophical
problems and psychological processes, in terms of maximal
satisfaction of multiple constraints and compute coherence by
using, a.o., connectionist algorithms (Thagard and Verbeurgt,
1998). Another measure of coherence is characterized as
continuity in design processes. This measure was developed for
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a design task (Jaarsveld and van Leeuwen, 2005) and calculated
by the occurrence of a given pair of objects in a sketch, expressed
as a percentage of all the sketches of a series. In a series of
sketches participants designed a logo for a new soft drink. Design
series strong in coherence also received a high score for their
final design, as assessed by professionals in various domains.
Indicating that participants with a high score for the creative
quality of their final sketch seemed better in assessing their design
activity in relation to the continuity in the process and, thereby,
seemed better in navigating the ill-defined space of a design
problem (Jaarsveld and van Leeuwen, 2005). In design problems
the quality of cognitive production depends, in part, on the
abilities to reflect on one’s own creative behavior (Boden, 1996)
and to monitor how far along in the process one is in solving it
(Gabora, 2002). Hence, design problems are especially suited to
study more complex problem solving processes.
KNOWLEDGE DOMAIN
Knowledge domain represents disciplines or fields of study
organized by general principles, e.g., domains of various arts
and sciences. It contains accumulated knowledge that can be
divided in diverse content domains, and the relevant algorithms
and heuristics. We also speak of knowledge domains when
referring to, e.g., visuo-spatial and verbal domains. This latter
differentiation may refer to the method by which performance
in a certain knowledge domain is assessed, e.g., a visuo-spatial
physics task that assesses the content domain of the workings of
mass and weights of objects.
In comparing tests results, we should keep in mind that apart
from reflecting cognitive processes evolving in different problem
spaces, the results also arise from cognition operating on different
knowledge domains. We argue that, the still contradictory
and inconclusive discussion about the relationship between
intelligence and creativity (Silvia, 2008), should involve the issue
of knowledge domain.
Intelligence tests contain items that pertain to, e.g., verbal,
abstract, mechanical and spatial reasoning abilities, while
their content mostly operates on knowledge domains that
are related to contents contained in school curricula. Items
of creativity tests, by contrast, pertain to more idiosyncratic
knowledge domains, their contents relating to associations
between stored personal experiences (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
The influence of knowledge domain on the relationships
between different test scores was already mentioned by
Guilford (1956, p. 169). This author expected a higher
correlation between scores from a typical intelligence test
and a divergent thinking test than between scores from two
divergent thinking tests because the former pair operated
on identical information and the latter pair on different
information.
Studies with the CRT showed that when knowledge domain
is controlled for, the development of intelligence operating in ill-
defined problem space does not compare to that of traditional
intelligence but develops more similarly to the development of
creativity (Welter et al., in press).
RELATIONSHIP INTELLIGENCE AND
CREATIVITY
The Threshold theory (Guilford, 1967) predicts a relationship
between intelligence and creativity up to approximately an
intelligence quotient (IQ) level of 120 but not beyond (Lubart,
2003; Runco, 2007). Threshold theory was corroborated when
creative potential was found to be related to intelligence up to
certain IQ levels; however, the theory was refuted, when focusing
on achievement in creative domains; it showed that creative
achievement benefited from higher intelligence even at fairly high
levels of intellectual ability (Jauk et al., 2013).
Distinguishing between subtypes of general intelligence
known as fluent and crystallized intelligence (Cattell, 1967), Sligh
et al. (2005) observed an inverse threshold effect with fluid IQ:
a correlation with creativity test scores in the high IQ group but
not in the average IQ group. Also creative achievement showed to
be affected by fluid intelligence (Beaty et al., 2014). Intelligence,
defined as fluid IQ, verbal fluency, and strategic abilities, showed
a higher correlation with creativity scores (Silvia, 2008) than
when defined as crystallized intelligence. Creativity tests, which
involved convergent thinking (e.g., Remote Association Test;
Mednick, 1962) showed higher correlations with intelligence than
ones that involved only divergent thinking (e.g., the Alternate
Uses Test; Guilford et al., 1978).
That the Remote Association test also involves convergent
thinking follows from the instructions; one is asked, when
presented with a stimulus word (e.g., table) to produce the first
word one thinks of (e.g., chair). The word pair table–chair is a
common association, more remote is the pair table–plate, and
quite remote is table–shark. According to Mednick’s theory (a)
all cognitive work is done essentially by combining or associating
ideas and (b) individuals with more commonplace associations
have an advantage in well-defined problem spaces, because the
class of relevant associations is already implicit in the statement
of the problem (Eysenck, 2003).
To circumvent the problem of tests differing in knowledge
domain, one can develop out of one task a more divergent
and a more convergent thinking task by asking, on the one
hand, for the generation of original responses, and by asking,
on the other hand, for more common responses (Jauk et al.,
2012). By changing the instruction of a task, from convergent
to divergent, one changes the constraints the solution has to
answer and, thereby, one changes for cognition its freedom of
operation (Razumnikova et al., 2009; Limb, 2010; Jauk et al.,
2012). However, asking for more common responses is still a
divergent thinking task because it instigates a generative and
ideational process.
Indeed, studying the relationship between intelligence and
creativity with knowledge domain controlled for yielded different
results as defined in the Threshold theory. A study in which
knowledge domain was controlled for showed, firstly, that
intelligence is no predictor for the development of creativity
(Welter et al., 2016). Secondly, that the relationship between
scores of intelligence and creativity tests as defined under the
Threshold theory was only observed in a small subset of primary
school children, namely, female children in Grade 4 (Welter
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et al., 2016). We state that relating results of operations yielded
by cognitive abilities performing in defined and in ill-defined
problem spaces can only be informative when it is ensured
that cognitive processes also operate on an identical knowledge
domain.
INTERTWINING OF COGNITIVE
ABILITIES
Eysenck (2003) observed that there is little justification for
considering the constructs of divergent and convergent thinking
in categorical terms in which one construct excludes the other. In
processes that yield original and appropriate solutions convergent
and divergent thinking both operate on the same large knowledge
base and the underlying cognitive processes are not entirely
dissimilar (Eysenck, 2003, p. 110–111).
Divergent thinking is especially effective when it is coupled
with convergent thinking (Runco, 2003; Gabora and Ranjan,
2013). A design problem study (Jaarsveld and van Leeuwen, 2005)
showed that divergent production was active throughout the
design, as new meanings are continuously added to the evolving
structure (Akin, 1986), and that convergent production was
increasingly important toward the end of the process, as earlier
productions are wrapped up and integrated in the final design.
These findings are in line with the assumptions of Wertheimer
(1945/1968) who stated that thinking within ill-defined problem
space is characterized by two points of focus; one is to work on
the parts, the other to make the central idea clearer.
Parallel to the discussion about the intertwining of convergent
and divergent thinking abilities in processes that evolve in
ill-defined problem space we find the discussion about how
intelligence may facilitate creative thought. This showed when
top-down cognitive control advanced divergent processing in the
generation of original ideas and a certain measure of cognitive
inhibition advanced the fluency of idea generation (Nusbaum and
Silvia, 2011). Fluid intelligence and broad retrieval considered
as intelligence factors in a structural equation study contributed
both to the production of creative ideas in a metaphor generation
task (Beaty and Silvia, 2013). The notion that creative thought
involves top-down, executive processes showed in a latent
variable analysis where inhibition primarily promoted the fluency
of ideas, and intelligence promoted their originality (Benedek
et al., 2012).
DEFINITIONS OF THE CONSTRUCTS
INTELLIGENCE AND CREATIVITY
The various definitions of the constructs of intelligence and
creativity show a problematic overlap. This overlap stems
from the enormous endeavor to unanimously agree on valid
descriptions for each construct. Spearman (1927), after having
attended many symposia that aimed at defining intelligence,
stated that “in truth, ‘intelligence’ has become a mere vocal sound,
a word with so many meanings that finally it has none” (p. 14).
Intelligence is expressed in terms of adaptive, goal-directed
behavior; and the subset of such behavior that is labeled
“intelligent” seems to be determined in large part by cultural or
societal norms (Sternberg and Salter, 1982). The development
of the IQ measure is discussed by Carroll (1982): “Binet
(around 1905) realized that intelligent behavior or mental ability
can be ranged along a scale. Not much later, Stern (around
1912) noticed that, as chronological age increased, variation in
mental age changes proportionally. He developed the IQ ratio,
whose standard deviation would be approximately constant over
chronological age if mental age was divided by chronological age.
With the development of multiple-factor-analyses (Thurstone,
around 1935) it could be shown that intelligence is not a simple
unitary trait because at least seven somewhat independent factors
of mental ability were identified.”
Creativity is defined as a combined manifestation of novelty
and usefulness (Jung et al., 2010). Although it is identified with
divergent thinking, and performance on divergent thinking tasks
predicts, e.g., quantity of creative achievements (Torrance, 1988,
as cited in Beaty et al., 2014) and quality of creative performance
(Beaty et al., 2013), it cannot be identified uniquely with divergent
thinking.
Divergent thinking often leads to highly original ideas that
are honed to appropriate ideas by evaluative processes of critical
thinking, and valuative and appreciative considerations (Runco,
2008). Divergent thinking tests should be more considered as
estimates of creative problem solving potential rather than of
actual creativity (Runco, 1991). Divergent thinking is not specific
enough to help us understand what, exactly, are the mental
processes—or the cognitive abilities—that yield creative thoughts
(Dietrich, 2007).
Although current definitions of intelligence and creativity try
to determine for each separate construct a unique set of cognitive
abilities, analyses show that definitions vary in the degree to
which each includes abilities that are generally considered to
belong to the other construct (Runco, 2003; Jaarsveld et al., 2012).
Abilities considered belonging to the construct of intelligence
such as hypothesis testing, inhibition of alternative responses,
and creating mental images of new actions or plans are also
considered to be involved in creative thinking (Fuster, 1997, as
cited in Colom et al., 2009, p. 215). The ability, for instance,
to evaluate, which is considered to belong to the construct of
intelligence and assesses the match between a proposed solution
and task constraints, has long been considered to play a role
in creative processes that goes beyond the mere generation of
a series of ideas as in creativity tasks (Wallas, 1926, as cited in
Gabora, 2002, p. 1; Boden, 1990).
The Geneplore model (Finke et al., 1992) explicitly models this
idea; after stages in which objects are merely generated, follow
phases in which an object’s utility is explored and estimated. The
generation phase brings forth pre inventive objects, imaginary
objects that are generated without any constraints in mind.
In exploration, these objects are evaluated for their possible
functionalities. In anticipating the functional characteristics of
generated ideas, convergent thinking is needed to apprehend
the situation, make evaluations (Kozbelt, 2008), and consider
the consequences of a chosen solution (Goel and Pirolli, 1992).
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Convergent reasoning in creativity tasks invokes criteria of
functionality and appropriateness (Halpern, 2003; Kaufmann,
2003), goal directedness and adaptive behavior (Sternberg,
1982), as well as the abilities of planning and attention.
Convergent thinking stages may even require divergent thinking
sub processes to identify restrictions on proposed new ideas
and suggest requisite revision strategies (Mumford et al., 2007).
Hence, evaluation, which is considered to belong to the construct
of intelligence, is also functional in creative processes.
In contrast, the ability of flexibility, which is considered to
belong to the construct of creativity and denotes an openness
of mind that ensures the generation of ideas from different
domains, showed, as a factor component for latent divergent
thinking, a relationship with intelligence (Silvia, 2008). Flexibility
was also found to play an important role in intelligent behavior
where it enables us to do novel things smartly in new situations
(Colunga and Smith, 2008). These authors studied children’s
generalizations of novel nouns and concluded that if we are
to understand human intelligence, we must understand the
processes that make inventiveness. They propose to include the
construct of flexibility within that of intelligence. Therefore,
definitions of the constructs we are to measure affect test
construction and the resulting data. However, an overlap between
definitions, as discussed, yields a test diversity that makes it
impossible to interpret the different findings across studies with
any confidence (Arden et al., 2010). Also Kim (2005) concluded
that because of differences in tests and administration methods,
the observed correlation between intelligence and creativity
was negligible. As the various definitions of the constructs of
intelligence and creativity show problematic overlap, we propose
to circumvent the discussion about which cognitive abilities are
assessed by which construct, and to consider both constructs as
being involved in one design process. This approach allows us
to study the contribution to this process of the various defined
abilities, without one construct excluding the other.
REASONING ABILITIES
The CRT is a psychometrical tool constructed on the basis of
an alternative construct of human cognitive functioning that
considers creative reasoning as a thinking process understood as
the cooperation between cognitive abilities related to intelligent
and creative thinking.
In generating relationships for a matrix, reasoning and more
specifically the ability of rule invention is applied. The ability
of rule invention could be considered as an extension of the
sequence of abilities of rule learning, rule inference, and rule
application, implying that creativity is an extension of intelligence
(Shye and Goldzweig, 1999). According to this model, we could
expect different results between a task assessing abilities of rule
learning and rule inference, and a task assessing abilities of rule
application. In two studies rule learning and rule inference was
assessed with the RPM and rule application was assessed with the
CRT. Results showed that from Grades 1 to 4, the frequencies
of relationships applied did not correlate with those solved
(Jaarsveld et al., 2010, 2012). Results showed that performance
in the CRT allows an insight of cognitive abilities operating on
relationships among components that differs from the insight
based on performance within the same knowledge domain
in a matrix solving task. Hence, reasoning abilities lead to
different performances when applied in solving closed as to open
problems.
We assume that reasoning abilities are more clearly reflected
when one formulates a matrix from scratch; in the process
of thinking and drawing one has, so to speak, to solve
one’s own matrix. In doing so one explains to oneself the
relationship(s) realized so far and what one would like to attain.
Drawing is thinking aloud a problem and aids the designer’s
thinking processes in providing some “talk-back” (Cross and
Clayburn Cross, 1996). Explanatory activity enhances learning
through increased depth of processing (Siegler, 2005). Analyzing
explanations of examples given with physics problems showed
that they clarify and specify the conditions and consequences
of actions, and that they explicate tacit knowledge; thereby
enhancing and completing an individual’s understanding of
principles relevant to the task (Chi and VanLehn, 1991).
Constraint of the CRT is that the matrix, in principle, can
be solved by another person. Therefore, in a kind of inner
explanatory discussion, the designer makes observations of
progress, and uses evaluations and decisions to answer this
constraint. Because of this, open problems where certain
constraints have to be met, constitute a powerful mechanism for
promoting understanding and conceptual advancement (Chi and
VanLehn, 1991; Mestre, 2002; Siegler, 2005).
CONCLUSION
Convergent and divergent thinking processes have been studied
with a variety of intelligence and creativity tests, respectively.
Relationships between performances on these tests have been
demonstrated and a large number of research questions have been
addressed. However, the fact that intelligence and creativity tests
vary in the definition of their construct, in their problem space,
and in their knowledge domain, poses methodological problems
regarding the validity of comparisons of test results. When we
want to focus on one cognitive process, e.g., intelligent thinking,
and on its different performances in well or ill-defined problem
situations, we need pairs of tasks that are constructed along
identical definitions of the construct to be assessed, that differ,
however, in the description of their constraints but are identical
regarding their knowledge domain.
One such possible pair, the Progressive Matrices Test and
the CRT was suggested here. The CRT was developed on
the basis of creative reasoning, a construct that assumes the
intertwining of intelligent and creativity related abilities when
looking for original and applicable solutions. Matched with
the Matrices test, results indicated that, besides similarities,
intelligent thinking also yielded considerable differences for both
problem spaces. Hence, with knowledge domain controlled,
and only differences in problem space remaining, comparison
of data yielded new results on intelligence’s operations. Data
gathered from intelligence and creativity tests, whether they are
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performance scores or physiological measurements on the basis
of, e.g., EEG, and fMRI methods, are reflections of cognitive
processes performing on a certain test that was constructed on
the basis of a certain definition of the construct it was meant to
measure. Data are also reflections of the processes evolving within
a certain problem space and of cognitive abilities operating on a
certain knowledge domain.
Data can unhide brain networks that are involved in
the performance of certain tasks, e.g., traditional intelligence
and creativity tests, but data will always be related to the
characteristics of the task. The characteristics of the task, such
as problem space and knowledge domain originated at the
construction of the task, and the construction, on its turn, is
affected by the definition of the construct the task is meant to
measure.
Here we present the CRT as one possible solution for
the described problems in cognition research. However, for
research on relationships among test scores other pairs of
tests are imaginable, e.g., pairs of tasks operating on the
same domain where one task has a defined problem space
and the other one an ill-defined space. It is conceivable
that pairs of test could operate, besides on the domain of
mathematics, on content of e.g., visuo-spatial, verbal, and
musical domains. Pairs of test have been constructed by
changing the instruction of a task; instructions instigated a
more convergent or a more a divergent mode of response
(Razumnikova et al., 2009; Limb, 2010; Jauk et al., 2012; Beaty
et al., 2013).
The CRT involves the creation of components and their
relationships for a 3 × 3 matrix. Hence, matrices created in the
CRT are original in the sense that they all bear individual markers
and they are applicable in the sense, that they can, in principle, be
solved by another person. We showed that the CRT instigates a
real design process; creators’ cognitive abilities are wrapped up
in a process that should produce a closed problem within an
ill-defined problem space.
For research on the relationship among convergent and
divergent thinking, we need pairs of test that differ in the problem
spaces related to each test but are identical in the knowledge
domain on which cognition operates. The test pair of RPM and
CRT provides such a pair. For research on the intertwining of
convergent and divergent thinking, we need tasks that measure
more than tests assessing each construct alone. We need tasks that
are developed on the definition of intertwining cognitive abilities;
the CRT is one such test.
Hence, we hope to have sufficiently discussed and
demonstrated the importance of the three test features, construct
definition, problem space, and knowledge domain, for research
questions in creative cognition research.
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